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28 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of Defense,
27 November 1978

1. The Secretary said he was very pleased with the Terms of Reference for the study on Soviet Naval Readiness that I had given to him last week. He is anxious that we proceed.

He expressed a hope that this study would clarify Soviet intentions with regard to use of their naval forces in an anti-SLOC mode or an anti-SSBN mode or defense of their own SSBN mode, etc. I told him that we had written a paper about the Soviet attitude towards the SLOC. He had read that and liked it and agreed with it. I told him of my reservations with it, subsequent revision of it which was in the Secretary of the Navy's office for review, and intent then to republish it plus continue on with a revisit of the whole issue in a joint CIA/Navy study.

2. The Secretary then asked for a new study to be done by the Intelligence Community. He would like to look at Soviet command, control, communications in intelligence; what their doctrine is--how they look at C³I, how do they test their C³I in exercises, and what does that tell us about their doctrine? Beyond this, how do they look on us, our strengths and weaknesses, in this area? How do they assess the overall U.S. and NATO command/control capabilities and vulnerabilities? Overall, he is looking for the Soviet concept for employment, and the Soviet sense of priorities in this area. Ask NFAC to consider what we can do here and let me know.

I told him that I was working up a Presidential brief in this area, and that I might supply him that first.

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7. I did not take up the African trends briefing. We just ran out of time. I had the feeling that it was less important for full review with Secretary Brown than some of our others.

8. I delivered the paper on the MIG-23 status and went through the points that I had in the discussion with Susan and Dennis. I found that very helpful. The Secretary was surprised and somewhat concerned when I mentioned the possibility that what the Cubans had received was a full squadron of ground attack aircraft. I also pointed out my concern that we really didn't know what the full bag of 48 hangarettes was for.

9. [REDACTED]

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10. I did not discuss the draft Presidential standards. I think we'll let this one go for the moment until it comes back up on the SCC.

11. I did discuss [REDACTED] He was not familiar with the new Air Force proposal for a different type of [REDACTED] I suggested that we have a rather thorough discussion of this next week because that would only be about two weeks ahead of the Presidential decisions and I really wanted to have his advice, particularly on the technical side. From what I described of the new Air Force proposal, his question was what were the advantages of it. We generally agreed that they were putting the capabilities in two different types of vehicles and there is somewhat less danger of loss by failure.

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12. We briefly discussed the telemetry issue. I mainly wanted to get a feel for whether he thought we were at a crunch point yet. He did not seem to think so.

13. [REDACTED]

14. I did not get to the Soviet command authority for a preemptive attack. I'd like to hold that one for the next time.

15. I didn't take up [REDACTED] exchange. Hold that until there is some development in it.

[REDACTED]

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17. I asked Secretary Duncan if he would ask the DIA people to cooperate with ours on the question of pulling together data. I particularly stressed that we needed to know something about the transportation patterns that would evolve depending on where the people who would come to Langley are residing today.

18. I didn't talk about the ALCM limits on SALT. Leave it in, please.

19. I didn't talk about the military situation in Vietnam. Leave it in, please.

20. I didn't talk about the collection opportunities and DIA's opposition. We can drop that one until there is some flare-back.

21. I thanked him for the cables from [] In point of fact, I found that we had only one cable and one page of the second cable, but I got Admiral Hanson's secretary to get me the missing one.

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22. Good preparation. Good meeting.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director